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ABSTRACT 
Introduction:  The chemotherapy use process is potentially risky for cancer patients. Vincristine, a 
“High Alert” medicine, has been associated with fatal but preventable medication errors. There is a 
need to improve the use of vincristine especially in lower and middle income countries with 
constraints with resources and adequate approaches to the administration of cancer medicines; 
however a rising prevalence of cancer cases. These concerns can be addressed by performing 
proactive risk assessments using Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and 
implementing the findings. Methods: A multidisciplinary health team driven by pharmacists identified 
and evaluated potential failure modes based on a vincristine use process flow diagram using a hazard 
scoring matrix in a leading referral hospital in Kenya. Results: The processes evaluated were: 
prescribing, preparation and dispensing, transportation and storage, administration and monitoring of 
the use of vincristine. 77 failure modes were identified over the 3 month study period, of which 25 
were classified as high risk. Thirteen were adequately covered by existing control measures while 12 
including one combined mode required new strategies.  Two of the failure modes were single-point 
weaknesses. Recommendations were subsequently made for improving the administration of 
vincristine. Conclusions: HFMEA is a useful tool to identify improvements to medication safety and 
reduction of patient harm. The HFMEA process brings together the multidisciplinary team involved in 
patient care in actively identifying potential failure modes and owning the recommendations made, 
which are now being actively followed up in this hospital. Pharmacists are a key part of this process. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
 
The chemotherapy use process is considered as potentially risky for cancer patients due to its 
complexity, use of medicines with narrow therapeutic indices, multiple drug use and use of potentially 
toxic compounds (1, 2). Medication errors can occur at any phase of the medication use process from 
prescription, preparation, dispensing, and administration to the monitoring of patients. The medication 
use process typically involves a multidisciplinary approach with physicians, pharmacists and nurses 
performing various roles (3).  
 
Medication errors lead to an increase in healthcare costs and diminish patient confidence in the 
healthcare system. Furthermore, they contribute to significant morbidity and mortality of hospitalized 
patients (2, 4). According to the Institute of Medicines (IOM) report, it is estimated that between 
44,000 to 98, 000 patients in America die yearly as a result of medication errors, which can be 
avoided. This is more than mortalities from automobile accidents, breast cancer or AIDS, and costs 
approximately US$ 29 billion annually (5, 6).  
 
Medication errors involving antineoplastic agents may potentially be catastrophic for patients because 
of their toxicity and the poor health status of many cancer patients (7, 8). However, unfortunately 
these are not uncommon.  In a study in Spain, medication errors were reported among 17.2% of 
patients on chemotherapy (9). The detected errors were stratified according to the process of use into 
prescriptions (75.7%), preparation (21%), dispensing (1.8%), administration (1.1%) and monitoring 
(0.4%) (9). In 2003, the Institute for Safe Medication Practices reported that cancer chemotherapy 
topped the list of high-alert medications, higher than intravenous potassium chloride and insulin as 
potential threats to patient safety (10) . Consequently, it is an important area to concentrate on. This is 
particularly the case in lower and middle income countries (LMICs), with LMICs currently accounting 
for approximately 57% of cancer cases worldwide and up to 70% of cancer deaths (11-14). In 
addition, affordability of cancer care is a key issue in LMICs and available resources and treatments 
must be carefully managed (15). 
 
Similar to the global trends, there is an increase in the number of cancer cases in Kenya which in turn 
has the potential to predispose many patients to the harmful effects of chemotherapeutic agents 
including vincristine (15, 16). According to a study in Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH), Nairobi, by 
Kurgat et al  (17), vincristine was administered to 4% and 36%  of patients treated in an out-patient 
oncology clinic and in-patient wards respectively for their cancers. Vincristine is listed as one of the 
high alert medicines (HAMs) by various patient safety organizations including the Institute of Safe 
Medication Practices (ISMP), the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare 
(ACSQHC), the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) (8, 18, 19). The risk of medication errors are high with vincristine 
due to its low therapeutic index and increasing usage (20). Medication errors associated with 
vincristine, especially inadvertent intrathecal administration, have a greater potential to cause harm 
and fatal outcomes (21); consequently care is needed with its administration. In 2015, it is believed 
that there were 120 reported cases of inadvertent intrathecal administration of vincristine worldwide 
with 32 documented in the English language of which 25 were fatal (22). Unfortunately, many other 
cases have gone unrecognised or unreported adding to the concerns with the prescribing and 
administration of vincristine (22, 23).  
 
The prescribing of vincristine and vincristine-based chemotherapy at KNH is typically undertaken by 
medical officers on specialisation training (senior house officers) under supervision of medical 
specialists. This is the practice in many teaching and referral hospitals worldwide (24-26). Currently at 
KNH, there is no formal induction training program for new healthcare professionals on the safe use 
of cytotoxics, no register of authorized physicians than can prescribe chemotherapy, or regular 
competency assessments. This is a concern given key issues surrounding the administration of 
cytotoxics. There is also currently no standard protocol for cancer management and the safe use of 
chemotherapeutic agents in KNH or other hospitals in Kenya dealing with cancer patients.  
Prescriptions are typically handwritten onto a specially designed oncology treatment sheet, with again 
the potential for errors. In addition, ordering of medicines is usually undertaken by nurses in KNH by 
duplicating the prescription onto a requisitioning form (S11) and non-schedule form for in-patients, 
while for out-patients the prescription will suffice. This can again lead to errors.  
 
Dispensing of vincristine and other cytotoxics is currently undertaken by pharmacists and 
pharmaceutical technologists at KNH under the supervision of oncology pharmacists. There is 
currently a centralised system of dispensing anticancer medications, with the pharmacy serving both 
out- and in-patients. Verification of medication orders and prescriptions are performed before 
dispensing medicines against the existing protocols and patient’s medical records to help reduce 
errors. However, mislabelling or lack of labels have been noted as risk factors for medication errors in 
chemotherapy (22, 27). Consequently, improvements can potentially be made in this area in KNH.  
 
The chemotherapy medications in KNH are usually collected by the nurse who verifies the medicines 
against the requisition form; subsequently, transports them for administration (out-patient) and 
storage (in-patient) awaiting administration.  Vincristine in KNH is the either dispensed in vials for 
preparation or in small-volume syringes for administration with other medications including intrathecal 
drugs. Preparation of vincristine is currently undertaken in two areas in KNH. There is a dedicated 
chemotherapy preparation room adjacent to oncology pharmacy manned by pharmacists and 
pharmaceutical technologists. However, due to inadequate pharmacy staff and high workloads, 
preparation is also currently undertaken in the procedure rooms in the wards by senior house officers. 
In the procedure rooms, there is currently no provision for independent double checks given that 
preparation and administration procedures are performed by the same senior house officers.  
 
The current production environment also does not fully guarantee the safety of staff involved in the 
preparation of vincristine and the sterility of the final product. The current facilities lack biological 
safety cabinets, adequate personal protective equipment, orderly and logical positioning of equipment 
or material, and is prone to interruptions by inpatients. Medication spillage is also a major concern as 
antineoplastic agents can cause acute and chronic problems on patients and handlers due to their 
mutagenic, teratogenic and carcinogenic effects (28, 29). 
 
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) is one of the techniques used for system improvement to 
enhance safety (30). FMEA is team-based, proactive, systematic and reasoned-based technique 
used to prevent process and outcome problems before they happen (31). FMEA has been used in the 
engineering field to improve quality, safety, reliability of products and reduce potential risks (32). The 
health sector has adopted a high-risk industry approach to safety and borrowed tools for the same 
purposes, renamed Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA) (30, 33). As a result, HFMEA 
is now being increasingly used to assess and improve the safety of healthcare processes, including IV 
drug administration, blood transfusions, and organ transplantations (30, 33, 34). JCAHO expects 
health organisations to conduct at least one proactive risk analysis of high-risk processes per year 
(35).  
 
However, we believe there have been few studies in Kenya that have used the HFMEA approach, 
and none to improve the use of vincristine.  Consequently, this study used Healthcare Failure Mode 
Effect Analysis (HFMEA) to better understand the risks associated with the vincristine use process in 
a leading teaching and referral hospital in Kenya since a preliminary audit undertaken at the oncology 
unit of the hospital revealed a lack of standard cancer treatment protocols and monitoring of 
processes. This builds on such studies in high income countries (30). The findings will be used to 
improve the process for vincristine administration in this and other relevant hospitals in Kenya 
benefitting all key stakeholder groups. It is envisaged the findings and their implications will also be 
useful to other LMICs where there is increasing use of vincristine. 
 
2 METHODS 
 
This study aimed at exploring the threats to patient safety and determining the appropriate medication 
errors mitigation strategies using the HFMEA method. 
 
2.1 Study Design and Site 
This study applied a prospective, system-focused clinical risk assessment entitled HFMEA of the 
Vincristine use process in the out-patient and in-patient oncology units of Kenyatta National Hospital 
(KNH) between April and June 2017 in the out-patient and in-patient oncology unit.  KNH is the 
largest referral and teaching hospital in Kenya with a 1800 bed capacity located in Nairobi. 
Consequently, if there are problems in this hospital, they are likely to be similar or greater in other 
hospitals in Kenya where vincristine is administered. 
 
2.2 Study Population and Sample Size Determination 
The study population comprised medical officers, pharmacists, pharmaceutical technologist and 
nurses working at the KNH oncology unit who are primarily involved in the vincristine use process of 
prescribing, preparation and dispensing, transportation and storage, administration and monitoring.  
The recommended size for a multidisciplinary team to improve processes is 6-10 members (31, 33). 
 
The multidisciplinary team was assembled according to HFMEA guidelines (31) (Box 1), similar to 
other countries (30). The team comprised 7 regular members and 2 advisors, the oncology ward 
paediatrician and the principal oncology pharmacist. The other members were 2 senior house officers 
in paediatrics and internal medicine, 1 pharmaceutical technologist and 1 pharmacist working in 
oncology pharmacy, 2 nurses working in the paediatric oncology ward and the adult oncology ward 
and the principal investigator (EKK), who led the team, participated in the study. Assistance was also 
provided by the senior personnel in the School of Pharmacy to help drive the process and 
documentation.  
 
2.3 HFMEA Procedure 
An assessment of prescribing, preparation and dispensing, transportation, storage, administration and 
monitoring of vincristine was carried out.  
 
An introductory meeting was held to take the members through the features of the HFMEA process as 
well as their roles and responsibilities. A second meeting was held whereby a process flow diagram 
(Figure 1) adapted from a study by Cheng et al (1) was developed. The principal investigator (EKK) 
consulted the team members in their respective units to further refine potential processes and sub-
processes to improve future use. The investigator requested members to enumerate potential failure 
modes and causes for each sub-process they are involved in. A third meeting was held whereby 
members determined the likelihood of potential failure modes occurring, the severity of their effects on 
patients and processes, and the chances of any failures being detected and intercepted before they 
occur thereby calculating the hazard score using hazard scoring matrix (Table 1). 
 
A fourth meeting was held to analyse the failure modes together with failure mode causes with a 
hazard score of 8 or higher, and those that are single point weakness for which further actions were 
needed, using the HFMEA decision tree. The failure modes and causes were analysed and 
categorized as eliminate, control or accept. On the fifth meeting, the team made recommendations for 
each failure mode cause(s) that needed to be controlled or eliminated. There was no particular order 
to the final identified failure modes. The selected failure modes were identified by the team as 
currently having inadequate preventive measures in place to help reduce their occurrences after a 
thorough analysis of all failure modes. 
 
2.4 Data Management, Quality Assurance and analysis 
The collected data was entered in EpiInfo® version 7 database. The data was then cleaned and 
validated. Access to the folders containing the data was controlled by a password known only to the 
researcher. The data was regularly backed up in a flash disk.  
 
The analysis was descriptive. Each failure mode was analysed independently and recommendations 
were made accordingly. 
 
2.5 Ethical approval 
Permission to conduct the study was granted by Kenyatta National Hospital/University of Nairobi 
Ethics and Research Committee (KNH-UoN-ERC) (Reference number KNH-ERC/A/317). The 
permission to collect data was also granted by the various departments where the study was 
conducted and registered by KNH Research and Programs Department. 
 
Informed consent and voluntary participation was given by healthcare workers without coercion or 
incentives. Research assistants were trained on ethical considerations before the commencement of 
the study.  
 
3. RESULTS 
Five meetings in total were held lasting on average 1.5 hours each. Due to difficulty in having all team 
members in one meeting, some meetings were held per department.  
 
3.1 HFMEA Process Description 
The process was sub-divided into 5 phases: (i) prescribing, (ii) preparation and dispensing, (iii) 
transportation, (iv) storage, and (v) administration and monitoring. Each process step and sub-step 
was enumerated and numbered consecutively.  
 
As mentioned, currently in KNH, the prescribing of vincristine is undertaken by medical specialists and 
senior house officers; dispensing is performed by pharmacists and pharmaceutical technologists; the 
preparation of medicines is undertaken by pharmaceutical technologists, pharmacists and senior 
house officers; transportation and storage is undertaken by nurses whilst administration and 
monitoring of medicines are performed by senior house officers. Preparation is undertaken in the 
oncology pharmacy preparation room and in-patient procedure rooms. Figure 1 illustrates the 
vincristine use processes and sub-processes. 
 
Seventy seven failure modes were identified, from which 19 were classified as high risk using a 
hazard scoring matrix (Table 1). Six other failure modes were identified to be single point weaknesses 
in the process. For each failure mode, failure mode causes were identified and hazard scores 
determined. Twelve of the 25 failure modes identified were not adequately covered by existing control 
measures. Two of these were single point weaknesses. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the 12 failure modes 
and failure mode causes determined by the HFMEA team using the decision tree method which were 
lacking adequate control measures that needed urgent addressing. Recommendations for these 
failure mode causes were subsequently made by the team to mitigate against future failures. 
Transportation and storage of vincristine were considered as low risk steps by the multidisciplinary 
team, so were not taken further. Section 3.2 describes the 12 failure modes and ways to address 
these in more detail. 
 
3.2 Failure modes and Recommendations  
Failure Mode 1: Out-dated weight and height measures indicated on the treatment sheet 
It was observed by the HFMEA multi-disciplinary team that majority of the patients especially in the 
wards do not currently have their latest weight and height measures in their treatment sheets. This 
has the potential of patients being under or over-dosed. The team recommended an amendment of 
the chart to provide for space for twice monthly charting of patients’ weight and height.  
 
Failure Mode 2: Past history inconclusive in determining last date of administration 
The current treatment chart does not provide adequate space to indicate the date of administration, 
which makes it difficult for the prescribers to schedule the next course of treatment. Amendments on 
the treatment sheet to provide space for including the date and the sensitization of prescribers on the 
difference between the scheduled day of treatment and the actual date of administration were 
recommended. 
 
Failure Mode 3: Dose Miscalculation 
Dose calculations by prescribers were considered to be a source of errors which can translate into 
patients being under- or over-dosed on their medications. Double-checks in the wards and in the 
pharmacy, as well as the development of job aids with formulas and dose limits, were recommended 
for adoption. 
 
Failure Mode 4: Obscure prescription/medication order 
The use of handwritten medication orders and dangerous abbreviations were considered as the main 
causes of obscure orders. The prescribers reported the restrictive size of the medication order on 
current forms as the cause of using abbreviations. It was recommended that the chart be redesigned 
to provide adequate space as well as sensitization of staff on agreed abbreviations to help avoid 
problems. In addition, the possible adoption of a Computerised Physician Order Entry (CPOE) 
System in chemotherapy prescribing was suggested. 
 
Failure Mode 5-7: Inadequate Labelling 
There was a lack of labels affixed on the medicine bag, vial/box, and syringe, and these were found to 
be wanting in providing adequate safeguards for the patients in terms of the identity of the 
chemotherapy medicine and patient, storage conditions, directions of use and warnings. Vincristine 
being a high-alert medication should have appropriate labels including warnings, which is currently 
lacking in the unit. The multidisciplinary team recommended that the standard operating procedure 
(SOP) for handling cytotoxics should be amended to provide for labelling requirements, the 
procurement of a labelling machine and the development of standard colour-coded labels with clear 
warning labels. 
 
Failure Mode 8: Medication Spillage 
Medication spillage especially during preparation is a preventable hazard that can cause serious harm 
to both handlers and patients. Inadequate working spaces both in the pharmacy chemotherapy 
preparation room and ward procedure rooms, as well as increased workloads, pose a greater risk of 
this event occurring. Recommendations to address this risk include sensitization or formal induction 
training of new staff in the various service departments as well as centralizing the preparation of 
cytotoxics in the pharmacy department. Preparation subsequently undertaken exclusively by 
pharmacy staff, adequately equipped with Biological safety cabinet/Externally ducted Negative 
pressure isolators and adequate working benches. 
 
Failure Mode 9: Failure to adequately confirm vital information before administration  
Heavy workload and inadequate staffing level predispose patients to the risk of various errors due to 
staff burnouts. Proper checks of all aspects (right medication, right patient, right dose, right time, right 
administration route, right sequence and right administration duration) need to be performed regularly 
by at least 2 pharmacy staff. Independent bedside double-checks by 2 nurses before administration or 
by the senior house officers need to be instituted, as well as ensure that medication administration is 
undertaken by at least 2 staff. These considerations need to be built into a future process plan for 
vincristine. 
 
Failure Mode 10a and 10b:  
Vincristine leaks to adjacent tissues (Extravasation) (10a) 
Veins are some of the most important assets of a patient, which need to be safeguarded (36). 
Vincristine is a vesicant medication which can cause tissue burns and necrosis. The team observed 
that cancer patients in KNH were predisposed to extravasation due to the use of peripheral 
intravenous access for administration of vincristine and other medicines. Staff sensitization on the 
prevention of extravasation, management, and the provision of extravasation kits in all chemotherapy 
administration areas were recommended. Vincristine dilution in minibags using Sodium chloride 0.9% 
should be undertaken to 20ml for patients aged less than 10 years and 50ml for patients greater than 
10 years old. This is already being enacted as part of the improved process. 
The doctor fails to notice exosmosis has occurred (10b) 
Post-administration monitoring of patients is vital especially after administering vesicant drugs such as 
vincristine. The team noted that sometimes due to heavy workload the senior house officers leave the 
room immediately after medication administration, which could lead to delayed detection of adverse 
events. It was recommended that chemotherapy administration should be undertaken by at least two 
staff between 8:30AM and 5:00PM on weekdays so that if there is need for medical specialists’ 
review, specialists can be accessed with ease. 
 
 
Failure Mode 11: Inadvertent intrathecal administration of vincristine 
Inadvertent intrathecal administration of vincristine has fatal ramifications for patients. The 
multidisciplinary team assessed the predisposing factors and found that there are inadequate control 
measures to prevent this event. For instance, vincristine is prepared in small volume syringes which 
could be confused for intrathecal use; vincristine and intrathecal medications are prescribed and 
administered on the same day; vincristine and intrathecal medications are stored in the same 
refrigerators and there is a lack of adequate warning labels on the syringe. The team recommended 
that vincristine be diluted in minibags using Sodium chloride (20ml for paediatrics and 50ml for 
adults). Scheduled administration of intravenous drugs should be different from intrathecal drugs, with 
intravenous drugs administered first. Adequate labelling of the medication including warning labels 
and proper sensitization of staff on proper handling of cytotoxics were also recommended. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
We used HFMEA to evaluate the vincristine use process aiming to improve the chemotherapy use 
process in both adult and paediatric oncology units in KNH. The HFMEA team found that the 
medication-use processes were complex, that processes were carried out by different cadres of 
health professionals with different levels of expertise, and that these processes were prone to many 
failure modes. The analysis enhanced the teams’ understanding of the various vulnerabilities and 
strengths in the chemotherapy use process. The detailed-nature of the HFMEA process highlighted 
risks that could be reduced easily as well as complex ones that required organizational approach. 
 
The 12 failure modes and causes were subsequently identified not to have adequate preventive 
measures in place to curb against their occurrences after a thorough analysis of the initial 77 failure 
modes. The HFMEA team reviewed the literature and expert opinions to identify potential activities 
aimed at preventing the occurrence of high risk failure modes (8, 21-23, 29, 37). The members were 
cognizant of the fact that KNH is a resource-limited health facility in a LMIC in their rationalization of 
proposed activities. In almost all the 12 failure mode causes, members listed more than one specific 
mitigation strategies to ensure that the failure mode cause is adequately countered. The majority of 
identified recommendations were seen as simple, quick and in-expensive to implement such as the 
dilution of vincristine in large volume syringes and double-checks of doses in wards and pharmacy. 
However, some long-term initiatives were also recommended such as the amendment of the 
chemotherapy chart to provide for space for twice monthly charting of patients’ weight and height and 
adoption of CPOE in chemotherapy prescribing. These are now being enacted. A number of the 
identified modes were similar to the earlier study of Tilburg et al including old treatment charts in the 
schedule, dose miscalculations and extravasation (30). However, some were different in our study 
including medication orders obscured, incomplete labelling and spillage (Table 2).  
 
Overall, the HFMEA process brought forth substantial group and individual benefits to the team 
members. The HFMEA provided members with an opportunity for continuous professional 
development as it is a rich learning experience. Greater importance of teamwork was also elicited 
during this process as members appreciated the important roles that different cadres play in the 
chemotherapy use process. The team members had to also factor in different beliefs and ideas about 
the chemotherapy use process from members where some worked together but their beliefs were 
diverse to arrive at a consensus going forward. The HFMEA team generally found the process 
worthwhile, and recommended this for other situations in the hospital and wider to improve future 
patient care.   
 
A detailed step by step description of vincristine use process was an additional valuable output of this 
process. This enabled members to audit and understand the sub-processes that they are involved in 
routinely. Overall, we believe the resultant process flow map can be used for audit and training 
purpose in this hospital and wider in Kenya as well as other similar LMICs experiencing problems with 
the administration of vincristine, with pharmacists playing a key role. The recommendations from this 
HFMEA are also expected to have a favourable effect on a large number of other medication use 
processes in KNH and wider in Kenya. Table 3 summarises the remedial activities for the high risk 
failure modes identified. 
 
Since the completion of this study, the findings have been forwarded to KNH Research and Programs 
Department - a body mandated policy decisions and implementation. The Oncology pharmacy has 
already started adopting some of the recommendations made. These include the sensitization of staff 
on vincristine dosage, medication errors and adverse events. A proposal for recruitment of oncology 
pharmacists has also been presented to the hospital management alongside procurement process for 
pertinent equipment to be used for the preparation of cytotoxics. As a result, a biological safety 
cabinet has now been installed in the hospital. Training on the safe handling of cytotoxics has also 
been carried out and the use of chemo-ports for children has been initiated.   
 
Since January 2019, a paediatric chemotherapy roadmap/protocol has been implemented for children 
being treated for malignancies in KNH. The roadmap is now in all paediatric files and a copy in the 
pharmacy. It is envisaged this will aid in minimising dosing errors and enhance the administration of 
correct regimens, and this is being followed up. A procurement proposal for a label’s printer, labels 
and spill kits was presented to the hospital management by November 2018, and is being enacted. A 
planned meeting to discuss the study results to KNH Journal club has also taken place to further 
improve the administration of vincristine in the hospital, and we will be monitoring these developments 
in the future. The pharmacy department has also been tasked in the 2018/2019 financial year target 
to develop an implementation plan for all recommendations from studies undertaken within the past 
one year. As a result, a study is currently being undertaken to determine the prevalence of vincristine 
medication errors after the implementation of the recommendations as the baseline prevalence study 
has already been undertaken by Kurgat et al (17). This will be reported in the future. 
 
Study Limitations 
HFMEA does not measure the actual failure rates or medication error rates. The determination of 
outcomes where there are no incidence reports is also a challenge. However for this study, outcomes 
for prescribing process (medication error prevalence of 98.8%) were available while other processes 
were estimated based on experience and a sense of what happens in KNH. HFMEA team members 
were expected to have biased personal opinions depending on the unit they work; however, this was 
minimised by having a multidisciplinary team. Overall, we believe our processes were robust 
providing direction for the future. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Multiple medication errors can occur at each stage of the chemotherapy use process making it a high-
risk process. These errors can have serious consequences. HFMEA is a useful tool to identify 
improvements to medication safety and reduce patient harm in all countries including LMICs. The 
HFMEA process driven by pharmacists also brings together the multidisciplinary team involved in 
patient care to identifying potential failure modes, who subsequently own the recommendations made, 
enhancing the chances of implementation. The impact of the suggestions in KNH made will be 
monitored, with further measures introduced if necessary to reduce concerns with the administration 
of vincristine in the hospital. It is envisaged that the findings with be of interest to other hospitals in 
Kenya administering vincristine as well as other LMICs. 
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Table 1: Hazard Scoring Matrix 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
t
y 
Severity of effect 
Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor 
Frequent 16 12 8 4 
Occasional 12 8 6 3 
Uncommon 8 4 4 2 
Remote 4 3 2 1 
 
Table 3: Summary of Remedial Strategies for High risk Failure Modes 
  Recommendations 
Prescribing 
 Amendment of the chemotherapy chart to provide for space for twice monthly charting of the patient weight 
and height. 
 Update prescribers on the difference between the schedule day and Date of administration 
 Redesign the Chemotherapy treatment chart to provide adequate space to affix the date of administration 
 Develop job aids for calculations of BSA, dosages and determine minimum and maximum doses 
 Redesign the Treatment chart to give provision for stage of treatment and schedule 
 Sensitize prescribers on non-standard abbreviations to avoid. 
 Adopt the use of Computerised Physician Order Entry System in chemotherapy prescribing 
 Dose calculation double-check 
Preparation and Dispensing 
 Design and print (purple) Colour-coded labels with Predesigned Warnings (BOLD) and Route of 
Administration. Name and IP/OP No. space provided 
  Develop clear policy guidelines on what to affix on the label and disseminate to staff in the unit 
 Design a clear warning label and affix on the syringe (INTRAVENOUS USE ONLY, FATAL IF ADMINISTERED VIA 
OTHER ROUTES) 
 Sensitize staff on the necessity of affixing warning labels 
 Ensure all areas where production, storage and administration of cytotoxics have spill kits 
 Centralize production of cytotoxics at the pharmacy to be done exclusively by pharmacy staff 
 Sensitize staff on how to handle cytotoxics especially new Senior house officers 
Administration and Monitoring 
 Enforce training and education to ensure Independent double checks are done by a Nurse or by two Senior 
house officers before administration at bedside 
 Ensure at least 2 staff perform medication administration 
 Provision of extravasation kits 
 Staff training on prevention of extravasation 
 Ensure administration is by slow IV for at least 2 minutes and flush with 10ML of Normal saline after 
administration 
 Dilute vincristine to 10ML volume for <10 years patients and 20ML for >10 years using Sodium Chloride 0.9% 
or 20ML Minibags for paeds and 50ML minibags  for adults 
 Prescribe vincristine and other intravenous drugs to be administered on a different day or time from 
Intrathecal medications. Intravenous medications be administered first 
 Vincristine and Intrathecal preparations should be packaged separately in colour-coded adequately labelled 
plastic bags. They should also be stored in separate refrigerators. 
 Chemotherapy administration be done strictly on weekdays between 8:30 AM and 5:00 PM 
 Enforce training on the importance of post-administration monitoring and ensure medication administration 
is done by at least 2 officers 
Table 2: Vincristine use process Failure Modes and Recommendations 
FAILURE MODE 
 
First Evaluate failure mode before 
determining potential causes 
POTENTIAL CAUSE 
SCORING DECISION TREE ANALYSIS 
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Recommendations 
 
1. Out-dated  patient height and weight measures 
indicated 
 
3 3 9    
 
1. Poor documentation 
3 3 9 
 
Control 
Twice monthly charting of weight and Height be documented on the 
Treatment sheet/Chemotherapy chart 
2. Lack of space to fix latest measures 
3 4 12 
 
Control 
Amend the Chemotherapy chart to provide for the provision of twice 
monthly charting of weight and height 
2. Previous history inconclusive in determining last 
date of  Vincristine administration 
 
3 3 9 
    
 1. Misinterpretation between schedule 
day and date of administration  3 3 9 
  
Control 
Update prescribers on the difference between the schedule day and 
Date of administration 
2. Inadequate space to affix the date 
on the Treatment sheet 3 4 12 
  
Eliminate 
Redesign the Chemotherapy treatment chart to provide adequate space 
to affix the date 
3. Dose miscalculation  4 3 12    Ensure double-checks in wards and pharmacy. 
 1. Non-adherence to treatment 
protocol 
3 3 9    Control 
Develop job aids for calculations of BSA, dosages and determine 
minimum and maximum doses 
 
2. Use of inaccurate BSA 
4 3 12   Control  
 Amend the Chemotherapy chart to provide for the provision of twice 
monthly charting of weight and height 
4. Medication order is obscure 
 4 2 8   
  
 Redesign the Treatment chart to give provision for stage of treatment and schedule 
 1. Use of non-standard abbreviations 3 3 9   Eliminate Sensitize prescribers on non-standard abbreviations to avoid. 
2.Handwritten medication orders 
3 3 9   Eliminate 
Adopt the use of Computerised Physician Order Entry System in 
chemotherapy prescribing 
5. Incomplete labelling of the primary packaging 
material (Name/IP No., Route administration, 
Warnings, Storage conditions)  
3 3 9    
 
1.Label on medicine bag misconstrued 
as appropriate label 
3 4 12   Eliminate 
Design and print (purple) Colour-coded labels with Predesigned 
Warnings (BOLD) and Route of Administration. Name and IP/OP No. 
space provided 
2. Lack of adequate space to affix the 
label 
3 3 9   Eliminate 
Print labels or Use Ziplock dispensing envelopes with space for patient 
name, IP/OP No,  
FAILURE MODE 
 
First Evaluate failure mode before determining potential causes 
POTENTIAL CAUSE 
SCORING DECISION TREE ANALYSIS 
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Recommendations 
 
6. Incomplete label affixed on the syringe((Name, IP/OP No, Preparation 
date, Expiry date, Medication name, dose and route of administration) 
 
3 4 12   
 Print label and affix on plastic Ziplock bag/ Purchase infusion minibags or use large 
volume syringes >20cc 
 1. Lack of clear guidelines on 
what to affix on the label 
3 4 12   Control 
Develop clear policy guidelines on what to affix on the label and 
disseminate to staff in the unit 
2. Lack of adequate space to 
affix the label 
3 3 9   Control 
Design  colour-coded  label, purchase  labels printer and print  with 
required items( (Name, IP/OP No, Preparation date, Expiry date, 
Medication name, dose and route of administration) 
7. Failure to affix WARNING label (INTRAVENOUS USE ONLY, FATAL IF 
ADMINISTERED VIA OTHER ROUTES) 
 2 4 8     
 
1.Lack of clear guidelines/SOP 2 4 8   Eliminate 
Design a clear warning label and affix on the syringe (INTRAVENOUS 
USE ONLY, FATAL IF ADMINISTERED VIA OTHER ROUTES) 
2.Lack of awareness on what to 
affix on the label 
2 4 8   Control Sensitize staff on the necessity of affixing warning labels 
8. Medication spillage  4 2 8     
 1. Lack of adequate working 
space 4 2 8   
Accept 
Ensure all areas where production, storage and administration of 
cytotoxics have spill kits 
2. Production in an 
inappropriate environment 4 2 8   
Control 
Centralize production of cytotoxics at the pharmacy to be done 
exclusively by pharmacy staff  
3. Poor handling of cytotoxics 4 2 8   
Control 
Sensitize staff on how to handle cytotoxics especially new Senior house 
officers 
9. Failure to adequately confirm vital information before administration 
(7R’s)  
4 1 4 YES 
Enforce training and education to ensure Independent double checks are done by a 
Nurse or by two Senior house officers before administration at bedside 
  
 1. Heavy workload 4 1 4 YES Accept Ensure at least 2 staff perform medication administration 
10a. Vincristine leaks to adjacent tissues(extravasation)  4 3 12   Provision of extravasation kits 
 1. IV line fixed adjacent to 
recently used venipuncture 
4 3 12   Control Staff training on prevention of extravasation 
 
2. Improper administration rate 
4 3 12   Control 
Ensure administration is by slow IV for at least 2 minutes and flush with 
10Ml of Normal saline after administration 
 3. IV line not fixed properly 4 2 8   Control Flushing of IV line before administration. 
 
4.Nonadherance to guidelines 4 2 8   Control 
Sensitize staff on the guidelines on prevention of extravasation. Dilute 
vincristine to 10ml volume for <10 years patients and 20ml for >10 
years using Normal saline 
10b.The doctors fails to notice exosmosis has occurred 
 
4 2 8   
 All units should have (Fully Kitted) extravasation kits. Chemotherapy administration 
be done strictly on weekdays between 8:30 AM and 5:00 PM 
 
 
1. The doctor was in a hurry 
due to heavy workload thus 
patient monitoring wasn’t 
done after administration 
4 2 8   Accept 
Enforce training on the importance of post-administration monitoring 
and ensure medication administration is done by at least 2 officers 
2. The patient turned around in 
bed 
4 2 8   Accept Ensure that the patient remains in bed still after administration 
FAILURE MODE 
 
First Evaluate failure mode before determining 
potential causes 
POTENTIAL CAUSE 
SCORING DECISION TREE ANALYSIS 
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Recommendations 
 
11. Inadvertent intrathecal administration of 
vincristine 
 
4 1 4  YES   
 
1.Use of small volume syringes that can 
be confused for intrathecal route use 
4 4 16  Eliminate 
Dilute Vincristine with 0.9% Normal saline using  large volume syringes; for 
paediatrics less 10 years use 10Ml syringes, more than 10 years 20Ml or 20ml 
Minibags for paeds and 50Ml minibags  for adults 
2.Prescribing vincristine and Intrathecal 
medication to be administered same day 
4 4 16   Eliminate 
Prescribe vincristine and other intravenous drugs to be administered on a 
different day and time from Intrathecal medications. Intravenous medications 
be administered first 
3.Transportation and storage of 
Vincristine and Intrathecal medication in 
the same place 
4 3 12   Control 
Vincristine and Intrathecal preparations should be packaged separately in 
colour-coded adequately labelled plastic bags. They should also be stored in 
separate refrigerators.  
4.Lack of Warning label 
3 4 12  Eliminate 
Ensure warning label is affixed black coded label.(INTRAVENOUS USE ONLY, 
FATAL IF ADMINISTERED VIA OTHER ROUTES) 
5.Lack of clear guidelines  
3 3 9   Control 
All staff designated to prescribe, prepare, dispense, transport and administer 
vincristine should be adequately trained on how to handle cytotoxics 
       
 
       
       
 Box 1 - Steps in HFMEA Procedure 
 Define the HFMEA topic 
 Assemble Team 
 Graphically describe the process: 
- Set up a flow diagram 
- Consecutively number each process step 
- If the process is complex, identify the area of process to focus on 
- Identify and consecutively number all sub-process steps 
- Create a process flow diagram. 
 Hazard Analysis: 
- List and consecutively number all potential failure modes for each process 
- Determine the severity and probability of potential failure modes and determine hazard score 
using hazard scoring matrix (Table 1)  
- Use decision tree to determine whether the failure mode warrants further action 
- List all failure mode causes for each failure mode which warrants further action 
 Identifying mitigation strategies: 
- Decide whether to “Eliminate”, “control” or “Accept” failure mode causes 
- Describe an action for each failure mode cause that will eliminate or control it 
- Identify outcome measure 
- Identify a single individual to complete the recommended action 
- Indicate whether top management  has concurred with the recommended actions 
 
  
Figure 1: HFMEA Process Flow Diagram 
                              1                                                                                        2 
  
                                                                                      
             Sub-Processes 
A. Checking patient’s medical record 
a. Diagnosis type of malignancy and staging 
b. Hypersensitivity history 
c. Co-morbidities and contraindications 
d. Chemotherapy schedule 
e. Relevant laboratory results 
B. Patient routine assessment 
a. Ordering appropriate tests 
b. Sample collection 
C. Dosing 
a. Measuring height and weight 
b. Calculating Body surface area 
c. Dose calculation 
D. Prescription Detailing 
a. Patient biodata (Name, age, sex,  
weight, height, IP/OP No., BSA) 
b. Diagnosis, staging and regimen 
c. Date of prescription and cycle number 
d. Drugs to be given(generic name(FULL),  
dose, route (FULL), frequency and duration  
of duration of administration) 
e.  Days, dates when each drug is to be given 
f. The prescriber’s name, designation and 
 signature  
E. Medication order sent to Pharmacy 
a. Prescription duplicated into Non- 
Schedule form and S11 
b. Medication order and patient file taken to 
 pharmacy 
     
 
            
                  3                                                  4                                            5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Preparation and dispensing 
 
Prescription 
           Sub-processes 
A. Verifying the prescription 
a. Checking for completeness 
i. Patient’s basic information (IP/OP number, date, doctor’s information,  
medicine quantity) 
ii. Checking administration information( date, medicine name, dosage,  
 days and frequency) 
B. Prescription Validation 
a. Checking for protocol adherence 
b. Confirm test results are optimal 
c. Dose Re-calculation 
d. Checking drug interactions, side effects profile and hypersensitivity 
e. Authorization by Oncology pharmacist 
C. Medicine Retrieval 
a. Control on the S11 
b. Charge, issue and record in the HMIS 
c. Checking for medicine availability 
d. Medicine retrieval 
e. Labelling of medicine bag 
f. Labelling of the medication 
g. Packing the medicine in a medicine bag 
h. Transportation to the Chemotherapy preparation room 
D. Medicine Preparation 
a. Staff don Personal protective equipment 
b. Checking if the patient identifiers(name, IP/OP No.), prescription, medicine, and 
label correspond with the original prescription 
c. Confirming the dosage, volume, and administration date 
d. Checking that medicine in vial is clear and without any foreign matter 
e. Syringe selection 
f. Drawing the medicine into a syringe 
g. Labelling of the syringe 
E. Packing the medicine 
a. Packing the medicine into a medicine bag 
b. Sealing the medicine bag 
c. Filling the S11 
d. Calling for transport  
 
 
Administration Storage Transportation 
               Sub-processes 
A. Patient Preparation 
a. Explaining to the patient the administration 
procedure and seeking informed consent 
b. Review recent blood tests results and Record 
baseline vital signs 
c. Cleaning injection site and fixing IV line 
B. Assembling Medicine and Materials 
a. The Nurse ensure the required items are 
prepared and availed 
b. Staff don Protective devices(PPEs) 
C. Medicine Re-confirmation 
a. Medical officer call the patient by name 
b. Two MOs checks the medicine against patient ID( 
7R’s) 
c. The Iv line is primed 
D. Medicine Administration 
a. Administration by slow Iv Push 
b. Remove the syringe 
c. Flush IV line with Normal saline 
d. Hydrate the patient 
e. Document date of administration and comments 
on the medication chart and notes 
E. Monitoring 
a. Check skin around IV access 
b. Monitor patient general wellbeing 
 
            Sub-processes 
A. Storage in the 
refrigerator 
 Sorting the drugs 
 Arranging the drugs 
 
            Sub-processes 
A. Calling for transport 
B. Receiving the medicine 
 Confirming the medication 
 Signing for the medicine 
C. Transport 
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